Tag: LFW

In Episode 6: The Problem of Luck with Alfred Mele of The Free Will Show (2020), one of the host, Matt Flummer, asks (6m29):

• “Some people complain that libertarianism requires that our actions be uncaused, so if they are uncaused (…) so what’s the problem, that people point out, with are actions being uncaused?”   

Alfred Mele then responds (6m44) : 

• “You know frankly, I can’t even make sense of the notion of an uncaused action, that is, I think uncaused actions are impossible. I think of actions as events caused in a certain way.”

Mele is a renowned philosopher, expert in libertarian free-will (LFW), so if he doesn’t grasp the idea of an uncaused action, it seems fair to assume that a wide number of philosophers have the same confusion about an uncaused action. This becomes even more evident when we consider that many of them still find the notion of libertarian free will itself mysterious, which includes agent and event causation, so we can just imagine the lack of comprehension when it comes to the Non Causal (NC) account. But I think, by compelling the NC proponent to clarify their position regarding the causal nature of their actions, there is a clear path forward. 

The argument can be structured as follows:

Premise 1: Non-Causal Accounts of LFW Rely on Difference-Making (CDM A/O).

Non-causal theories of LFW, while rejecting that free actions are determined by prior events or possess a traditional internal causal structure, must still explain how an agent exercises control in bringing about an action rather than another, or an action rather than an omission. This explanation, it is argued, implicitly or explicitly relies on the agent being a difference-maker for the action’s occurrence. The Causes as Difference-Makers principle “CDM : If C caused E, then, had C not occurred, the absence of C wouldn’t have caused E.” (Sartorio 2005)

Indeed, the notion of agent control seems to presuppose at least a minimal level of difference-making. Even passive background conditions necessary for an event (such as the presence of oxygen for a fire [1]) can be seen as difference-makers in a broad sense – without them, the event would not occur that way. Non-causal theorists, who attribute to the agent a far more direct and active role in ‘performing’ or ‘settling’ an action than that of a mere background condition, must surely be committed to the agent making at least this kind of difference, if not a more robust one. To deny that the agent’s involvement constitutes difference-making would be to render their contribution to the action even more tenuous than that of a static environmental factor, thereby undermining the very notion of control they seek to establish.

Non-causalists often describe the agent as directly “settling” what happens or “making it the case” that an action occurs. For instance, Carl Ginet speaks of an “actish phenomenal quality” where it seems to the agent as if she is directly bringing about the event (Clarke, Capes et Swenson, 2021, sect. 1.1). Hugh McCann describes free actions as an intentional, spontaneous and “creative undertaking on the agent’s part” (Clarke 2003, p. 20). This direct involvement implies that the agent’s performance of action A is what makes A occur; if the agent had not so performed, A (through that specific exercise of agency) would not have occurred.

If control is exercised “in” or “by” acting, as some non-causalists like Palmer, and Ginet, suggest (2021, p.10050), then the agent’s very performance of the action is what makes the crucial difference. The action happens because the agent performs it. As Palmer describes : 

Assuming that no-one else and nothing else has control over whether her action or decision occurs, the person can exercise control over whether her action or decision occurs simply by performing that action or by making that decision, where her performing that action or making that decision constitutes her exercise of control over whether that action or decision occurs.” (2021, p.10052)

This aligns with the core of Carolina Sartorio’s CDM (A/O) [2] principle: 

If an agent’s acting in a certain way caused E, then, had the agent failed to act that way, the agent’s failing to act that way wouldn’t have caused E. Conversely, if an agent’s failing to act in a certain way caused E, then, had the agent acted that way, the agent’s acting that way wouldn’t have caused E. (2005, p. 80)

The agent’s specific action brings about the action’s occurrence (or its being settled), while the corresponding specific omission (failing to perform that very action) would not bring about that same action’s occurrence. This establishes the asymmetry central to difference-making.

Without such a difference-making role, it’s unclear how the agent could be said to control the action. If what the agent does (or doesn’t do) makes no difference to whether the action occurs, the notion of control seems to evaporate.

Premise 2: The CDM (A/O) Principle Describes a Causal Relationship of Dependence.

The Causes as Differences-Makers (A/O) principle is articulated in terms of counterfactuals: what would (or would not) have happened if the agent had acted differently (e.g., omitted an action they performed, or performed an action they omitted). This reliance on counterfactuals links it directly to theories of causation based on dependence.

Sartorio’s work aims to capture David Lewis’s insight that “We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the difference it makes must be a difference from what would have happened without it” (Lewis, 1973, as cited in Sartorio, 2005, p. 71). While she critiques Lewis’s specific theory, her CDM principle itself is built upon assessing the difference an event (or its absence) makes, which is a counterfactual notion.

Ned Hall, in “Two Concepts of Causation,” (2004) explicitly identifies “dependence” as one of the two fundamental varieties of causation. He defines it as “counterfactual dependence between wholly distinct events” (p. 1). Critically, he states, “Dependence: Counterfactual dependence between wholly distinct events is sufficient for causation” (p.1). If CDM (A/O) embodies such counterfactual dependence, then, according to Hall’s framework, it describes a genuinely causal relation.

Thus, if an agent’s control is grounded in their being a difference-maker in the sense captured by CDM (A/O), and this principle articulates a relationship of counterfactual dependence, then this aspect of control is, by these lights, causal.

Conclusion: Non-Causal Accounts of LFW Are Therefore (Dependence-)Causal.

If both Premise 1 and Premise 2 hold, then non-causal accounts of LFW, by relying on a difference-making principle like CDM (A/O) to ground agent control, inherently incorporate a causal relationship (specifically, causal dependence).

This leads to the Dilemma for Non-Causal Theorists:

• Horn 1 : If non-causal theorists accept that their account of control relies on a principle like CDM (A/O) and that this principle describes a form of causal dependence, then their theories are not “non-causal” simpliciter. This admission might not be a defeat but an opportunity for clarification. They could distinguish the type of causation they are employing (i.e., difference-making, counterfactual dependence, perhaps akin to an “enabling” or “structuring” cause) from the types of causation they reject (e.g., “productive” causation in Hall’s sense, or deterministic event-causation). This would mean their theories are “non-causal” in a productive way or “non-event- causally-determined” rather than entirely devoid of any causal relations. Such a move could provide a more robust and less mysterious grounding for control than appeals to purely intrinsic features of actions or subjective experiences alone.
  
• Horn 2 : If non-causal theorists deny any reliance on a difference-making principle like CDM (A/O) for grounding control, they face the significant challenge of explaining how an agent can be in control of an action if their acting or not acting makes no difference to whether the action occurs or is settled. Given that even passive background conditions (like the presence of oxygen for a fire) can be understood as difference-makers in the broad sense that without them the effect would not occur, for an agent’s active role in “performing” or “settling” an action to constitute control, it must surely involve at least this minimal level of difference-making. To deny that the agent’s involvement makes such a difference would be to render their contribution to the action even more tenuous than that of a static environmental factor, thereby undermining the very notion of control. As Randolph Clarke (2003) notes, purely non-causal accounts (like those of Ginet or McCann, if interpreted as devoid of such difference-making) “are found not to offer satisfactory views of action and reason-explanation” (p. 1), and their accounts of the “exercise of active control” (p.3) can appear mysterious or insufficient. Without the agent as a difference-maker, the connection between the agent and the action may become too tenuous to support robust control and moral responsibility.

In essence, our argument pushes non-causal theorists to clarify the nature of the agent’s contribution to action. If that contribution is understood as making a difference in a way captured by counterfactual dependence (CDM A/O), then it implies a causal relationship. If it is not understood as difference-making, the basis of control becomes more obscure than ever.

[1] Here are two more examples of background conditions: 1) For a plant to grow, planting a seed is a direct action, but this only leads to growth if certain background conditions are met. These include the presence of water in the soil, a suitable temperature range, and available light. Without these enabling environmental factors, the seed will not sprout or thrive, regardless of being planted. 2) Similarly, for an electrical appliance to operate, flipping its switch to the “on” position enables the flow of electricity, the proximate cause. However, this action is futile without crucial background conditions such as a connected power source, an intact and closed electrical circuit, and operational internal components within the appliance itself.

[2]  Causes‑as‑difference‑makers is a general principle. CDM (A/O)—its formulation for agents’ actions and omissions—has been developed most fully by Sartorio (2016). The underlying idea can be traced back to John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic (1843), David Lewis’s “Causation” (1973), and Ned Hall’s “Two Concepts of Causation” (2004), among others.

References

Clarke, R. (2003). Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. New York, NY, US : Oxford University Press USA. https://doi.org/10.1093/019515987X.001.0001

Clarke, R., Capes, J., & Swenson, P. (Fall 2021 Edition). Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/incompatibilism-theories/

Cyr, T., & Flummer, M. (Hosts). (2020, September 28). The Problem of Luck with Alfred Mele (No. 6) [Audio podcast episode]. In The Free Will Show. Buzzsprout. https://www.buzzsprout.com/1244627/episodes/5575288-episod-6-the-problem-of-luck-with-alfred-mele

Hall, N. (2004). Two concepts of causation. In J. Collins, N. Hall, & L. Paul (Eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals (pp. 225-276). MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/1752.003.0010

Palmer, D. (2021). Free will and control: a noncausal approach. Synthese, 198(10), 10043–10062. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01701-5

Sartorio, C. (2005). Causes As Difference-Makers. Philosophical Studies, 123(1-2), 71-96. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-5217-y