The Free Will Defense: A Libertarian Perspective

Tag: Agency

  • The Dilemma for Non-Causal Accounts of LFW

    The Dilemma for Non-Causal Accounts of LFW

    In Episode 6: The Problem of Luck with Alfred Mele of The Free Will Show (2020), one of the host, Matt Flummer, asks (6m29):

    • “Some people complain that libertarianism requires that our actions be uncaused, so if they are uncaused (…) so what’s the problem, that people point out, with are actions being uncaused?”   

    Alfred Mele then responds (6m44) : 

    • “You know frankly, I can’t even make sense of the notion of an uncaused action, that is, I think uncaused actions are impossible. I think of actions as events caused in a certain way.”

    Mele is a renowned philosopher, expert in libertarian free-will (LFW), so if he doesn’t grasp the idea of an uncaused action, it seems fair to assume that a wide number of philosophers have the same confusion about an uncaused action. This becomes even more evident when we consider that many of them still find the notion of libertarian free will itself mysterious, which includes agent and event causation, so we can just imagine the lack of comprehension when it comes to the Non Causal (NC) account. But I think, by compelling the NC proponent to clarify their position regarding the causal nature of their actions, there is a clear path forward. 

    The argument can be structured as follows:

    Premise 1: Non-Causal Accounts of LFW Rely on Difference-Making (CDM A/O).

    Non-causal theories of LFW, while rejecting that free actions are determined by prior events or possess a traditional internal causal structure, must still explain how an agent exercises control in bringing about an action rather than another, or an action rather than an omission. This explanation, it is argued, implicitly or explicitly relies on the agent being a difference-maker for the action’s occurrence. The Causes as Difference-Makers principle “CDM : If C caused E, then, had C not occurred, the absence of C wouldn’t have caused E.” (Sartorio 2005)

    Indeed, the notion of agent control seems to presuppose at least a minimal level of difference-making. Even passive background conditions necessary for an event (such as the presence of oxygen for a fire [1]) can be seen as difference-makers in a broad sense – without them, the event would not occur that way. Non-causal theorists, who attribute to the agent a far more direct and active role in ‘performing’ or ‘settling’ an action than that of a mere background condition, must surely be committed to the agent making at least this kind of difference, if not a more robust one. To deny that the agent’s involvement constitutes difference-making would be to render their contribution to the action even more tenuous than that of a static environmental factor, thereby undermining the very notion of control they seek to establish.

    Non-causalists often describe the agent as directly “settling” what happens or “making it the case” that an action occurs. For instance, Carl Ginet speaks of an “actish phenomenal quality” where it seems to the agent as if she is directly bringing about the event (Clarke, Capes et Swenson, 2021, sect. 1.1). Hugh McCann describes free actions as an intentional, spontaneous and “creative undertaking on the agent’s part” (Clarke 2003, p. 20). This direct involvement implies that the agent’s performance of action A is what makes A occur; if the agent had not so performed, A (through that specific exercise of agency) would not have occurred.

    If control is exercised “in” or “by” acting, as some non-causalists like Palmer, and Ginet, suggest (2021, p.10050), then the agent’s very performance of the action is what makes the crucial difference. The action happens because the agent performs it. As Palmer describes : 

    Assuming that no-one else and nothing else has control over whether her action or decision occurs, the person can exercise control over whether her action or decision occurs simply by performing that action or by making that decision, where her performing that action or making that decision constitutes her exercise of control over whether that action or decision occurs.” (2021, p.10052)

    This aligns with the core of Carolina Sartorio’s CDM (A/O) [2] principle: 

    If an agent’s acting in a certain way caused E, then, had the agent failed to act that way, the agent’s failing to act that way wouldn’t have caused E. Conversely, if an agent’s failing to act in a certain way caused E, then, had the agent acted that way, the agent’s acting that way wouldn’t have caused E. (2005, p. 80)

    The agent’s specific action brings about the action’s occurrence (or its being settled), while the corresponding specific omission (failing to perform that very action) would not bring about that same action’s occurrence. This establishes the asymmetry central to difference-making.

    Without such a difference-making role, it’s unclear how the agent could be said to control the action. If what the agent does (or doesn’t do) makes no difference to whether the action occurs, the notion of control seems to evaporate.

    Premise 2: The CDM (A/O) Principle Describes a Causal Relationship of Dependence.

    The Causes as Differences-Makers (A/O) principle is articulated in terms of counterfactuals: what would (or would not) have happened if the agent had acted differently (e.g., omitted an action they performed, or performed an action they omitted). This reliance on counterfactuals links it directly to theories of causation based on dependence.

    Sartorio’s work aims to capture David Lewis’s insight that “We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the difference it makes must be a difference from what would have happened without it” (Lewis, 1973, as cited in Sartorio, 2005, p. 71). While she critiques Lewis’s specific theory, her CDM principle itself is built upon assessing the difference an event (or its absence) makes, which is a counterfactual notion.

    Ned Hall, in “Two Concepts of Causation,” (2004) explicitly identifies “dependence” as one of the two fundamental varieties of causation. He defines it as “counterfactual dependence between wholly distinct events” (p. 1). Critically, he states, “Dependence: Counterfactual dependence between wholly distinct events is sufficient for causation” (p.1). If CDM (A/O) embodies such counterfactual dependence, then, according to Hall’s framework, it describes a genuinely causal relation.

    Thus, if an agent’s control is grounded in their being a difference-maker in the sense captured by CDM (A/O), and this principle articulates a relationship of counterfactual dependence, then this aspect of control is, by these lights, causal.

    Conclusion: Non-Causal Accounts of LFW Are Therefore (Dependence-)Causal.

    If both Premise 1 and Premise 2 hold, then non-causal accounts of LFW, by relying on a difference-making principle like CDM (A/O) to ground agent control, inherently incorporate a causal relationship (specifically, causal dependence).

    This leads to the Dilemma for Non-Causal Theorists:

    • Horn 1 : If non-causal theorists accept that their account of control relies on a principle like CDM (A/O) and that this principle describes a form of causal dependence, then their theories are not “non-causal” simpliciter. This admission might not be a defeat but an opportunity for clarification. They could distinguish the type of causation they are employing (i.e., difference-making, counterfactual dependence, perhaps akin to an “enabling” or “structuring” cause) from the types of causation they reject (e.g., “productive” causation in Hall’s sense, or deterministic event-causation). This would mean their theories are “non-causal” in a productive way or “non-event- causally-determined” rather than entirely devoid of any causal relations. Such a move could provide a more robust and less mysterious grounding for control than appeals to purely intrinsic features of actions or subjective experiences alone.
    • Horn 2 : If non-causal theorists deny any reliance on a difference-making principle like CDM (A/O) for grounding control, they face the significant challenge of explaining how an agent can be in control of an action if their acting or not acting makes no difference to whether the action occurs or is settled. Given that even passive background conditions (like the presence of oxygen for a fire) can be understood as difference-makers in the broad sense that without them the effect would not occur, for an agent’s active role in “performing” or “settling” an action to constitute control, it must surely involve at least this minimal level of difference-making. To deny that the agent’s involvement makes such a difference would be to render their contribution to the action even more tenuous than that of a static environmental factor, thereby undermining the very notion of control. As Randolph Clarke (2003) notes, purely non-causal accounts (like those of Ginet or McCann, if interpreted as devoid of such difference-making) “are found not to offer satisfactory views of action and reason-explanation” (p. 1), and their accounts of the “exercise of active control” (p.3) can appear mysterious or insufficient. Without the agent as a difference-maker, the connection between the agent and the action may become too tenuous to support robust control and moral responsibility.

    In essence, our argument pushes non-causal theorists to clarify the nature of the agent’s contribution to action. If that contribution is understood as making a difference in a way captured by counterfactual dependence (CDM A/O), then it implies a causal relationship. If it is not understood as difference-making, the basis of control becomes more obscure than ever.

    [1] Here are two more examples of background conditions: 1) For a plant to grow, planting a seed is a direct action, but this only leads to growth if certain background conditions are met. These include the presence of water in the soil, a suitable temperature range, and available light. Without these enabling environmental factors, the seed will not sprout or thrive, regardless of being planted. 2) Similarly, for an electrical appliance to operate, flipping its switch to the “on” position enables the flow of electricity, the proximate cause. However, this action is futile without crucial background conditions such as a connected power source, an intact and closed electrical circuit, and operational internal components within the appliance itself.

    [2]  Causes‑as‑difference‑makers is a general principle. CDM (A/O)—its formulation for agents’ actions and omissions—has been developed most fully by Sartorio (2016). The underlying idea can be traced back to John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic (1843), David Lewis’s “Causation” (1973), and Ned Hall’s “Two Concepts of Causation” (2004), among others.

    References

    Clarke, R. (2003). Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. New York, NY, US : Oxford University Press USA. https://doi.org/10.1093/019515987X.001.0001

    Clarke, R., Capes, J., & Swenson, P. (Fall 2021 Edition). Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/incompatibilism-theories/

    Cyr, T., & Flummer, M. (Hosts). (2020, September 28). The Problem of Luck with Alfred Mele (No. 6) [Audio podcast episode]. In The Free Will Show. Buzzsprout. https://www.buzzsprout.com/1244627/episodes/5575288-episod-6-the-problem-of-luck-with-alfred-mele

    Hall, N. (2004). Two concepts of causation. In J. Collins, N. Hall, & L. Paul (Eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals (pp. 225-276). MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/1752.003.0010

    Palmer, D. (2021). Free will and control: a noncausal approach. Synthese, 198(10), 10043–10062. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01701-5

    Sartorio, C. (2005). Causes As Difference-Makers. Philosophical Studies, 123(1-2), 71-96. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-5217-y

  • Beyond Our Design: How Emergent Orders Shape Their Makers

    Beyond Our Design: How Emergent Orders Shape Their Makers

    Introduction: The Invisible Currents

    We’ve all felt it—that sense of navigating currents not entirely of our own making. Societal expectations, economic forces, the pull of technology, even the momentum of our own habits. We build things, join groups, and create for our benefit, only to find ourselves shaped by these very creations. Is there a deeper, universal pattern at play here? A fundamental way in which systems, once created for advantage, turn around to govern their creators?

    This article proposes to explore a recurring dynamic, from the simplest life forms to the complexities of human society, and even within our own minds. It’s a process where entities strive for advancement by forming higher-level structures, which then, inevitably, guide and constrain them. This isn’t necessarily sinister, but it’s a profound aspect of how complexity and life itself organize.

    Part 1: The Universal Drive – Efficiency, Scale, and Connection

    At the heart of this dynamic lies a fundamental drive towards optimization. In his fascinating book, Scale: The Universal Laws of Life, Growth, and Death in Organisms, Cities, and Companies, Geoffrey West highlights universal laws governing how systems organize for survival and efficiency. He demonstrates that networks—whether biological, like the circulatory system, or infrastructural, like a city’s road network—share striking characteristics:

    1. They are fractal and space-filling: they extend to serve the entire organism or relevant area.
    2. Their endpoints are invariant: the size of blood capillaries or household taps remains remarkably similar, whether in a mouse or a whale, a small house or a huge industrial complex.
    3. They constantly optimize efficiency: energy is minimized, and output maximized.

    These principles lead to predictable scaling laws. For instance, larger cities or organisms are proportionally more efficient. A city ten times larger doesn’t need ten times more gas stations; it will require significantly fewer, achieving economies of scale. This quest for efficiency and optimization isn’t just a human design; it’s a fundamental driver pushing the formation and persistence of organized structures.

    Part 2: The First Principle – Emergent Governance for Scaled Advantage (Often at the Collective Level)

    This tendency towards optimization doesn’t just refine what already exists; it leads to the creation of new organizational levels, paving the way for qualitatively new possibilities. This brings us to our first core idea:

    Principle 1: Emergent Governance for Scaled Advantage

    When constituent elements (like cells, individuals, or even ideas) self-organize or are structured into a higher functional level to unlock new potentials—often primarily benefiting the survival, propagation, or capabilities of the collective or species—that emergent level inevitably exerts top-down causal governance over its constituents. This establishes a functional interdependence where component autonomy is frequently exchanged for systemic advancement, an advancement that may not always translate to direct, unmitigated benefit for every individual component.

    Let’s unpack this:

    • The Drive: The motivation here is the unlocking of “new potentials.” Crucially, these potentials often manifest as “evolutionary advantages” for the species as a whole (e.g., greater population numbers, wider geographical spread) or enhanced capabilities for the system itself. This drive doesn’t always equate to an improved quality of life or increased autonomy for every individual constituent. It’s about reaching genuinely new modes of existence for the collective.
    • The Inevitable Consequence: Top-down causal governance isn’t an accidental byproduct; it’s a necessary outcome for the new, higher level to cohere, function, and sustain these collective advantages. For the system to operate effectively, its components must, to some extent, align their actions with the needs and dynamics of the whole, even if this imposes constraints.
    • The Pact (Often Asymmetrical): This creates a “functional interdependence.” Components cede a degree of autonomy. In return, they become part of a system that might offer enhanced protection, stability, or the ability to achieve things impossible for individuals. However, this “pact” can be asymmetrical. The “systemic advancement” is the primary outcome from the perspective of the higher level or the species, and individual well-being might be a secondary concern or even be diminished in certain aspects for the sake of the collective’s overall success or persistence.

    Illustrative Example: The Wheat Bargain – How Wheat Domesticated Us

    Yuval Noah Harari, in his book Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, provides a paradigmatic example of this nuanced principle with “The Wheat Bargain.” He argues that the agricultural revolution, centered on the cultivation of crops like wheat, was a turning point where humans, in seeking to control their food supply, inadvertently became controlled by it, leading to species-level success at the cost of much individual hardship.

    From wheat’s “perspective,” this was an astounding evolutionary success. A wild grass confined to a small region in the Middle East exploded across the globe, thanks to human labor. For Homo sapiens as a species, agriculture allowed for massive population growth and the development of complex societies. But for individual humans, the bargain was far more complex and, in many ways, detrimental.

    • Increased Labor, Harsher Life: Farming wheat was far more arduous than foraging. It demanded grueling hours of tilling, sowing, weeding, and harvesting. Diets often became less varied, leading to nutritional deficiencies. Sedentary agricultural life also increased susceptibility to disease and the risk of starvation if the single staple crop failed.
    • The Trap of Luxury: The initial steps towards agriculture seemed logical—a little more food security. However, as Harari explains, these “luxuries” gradually became necessities. Each generation was born into a world more dependent on agriculture, with little memory of a different way of life. The perceived benefits of increased food production for a growing population (a species-level advantage) masked the individual sacrifices in health and quality of life.
    • Domestication by Labor: Ultimately, humans became tied to the land and the relentless cycles of wheat cultivation. Their social structures, daily routines, and even their physical health were profoundly shaped by the demands of this plant. Harari provocatively suggests that humans didn’t so much domesticate wheat as wheat domesticated humans.

    This “Wheat Bargain” perfectly illustrates Principle 1: humans created a new organizational level (agriculture) to gain an advantage (food security, ability to support larger populations – clear species-level benefits). This system, in turn, exerted powerful top-down governance, fundamentally altering human life and creating a deep functional interdependence. The very system designed for collective benefit began to dictate the terms of existence for its creators, often to the detriment of individual well-being, a clear instance of an emergent order shaping its makers for its own systemic proliferation.

    Part 3: The Second Principle – The Exclusive Power of New Levels

    If the first principle explains why and how higher levels form and govern (often prioritizing collective gains), the second principle addresses the unique nature of what emerges at these new scales.

    Principle 2: Level-Exclusive Functionality and Control

    The evolutionary emergence of a new, higher organizational level is typically characterized by the appearance of novel functions and capabilities that are exclusively operable at, and often define, that specific level. Consequently, the natural locus of operation and control for these level-exclusive functions resides within the emergent higher-level entity itself.

    Let’s break this down:

    • Novelty and Exclusivity: The new functions that appear aren’t just bigger or more efficient versions of what the individual components could do. They are new kinds of operations, entirely novel abilities that can only be performed by the integrated collective. A single neuron cannot think, but a brain can. A single citizen cannot pass laws, but a government can. These are capabilities that define the new level.
    • Locus of Control: Because these functions are exclusive to the higher level, that level itself becomes the natural operator or controller of these functions. The integrated whole is where these unique capacities are enacted and managed.

    Illustrative Example: The Dawn of Multicellular Cooperation (Simplified)

    Consider the monumental leap from single, independent cells, each fending for itself, to the earliest forms of multicellular life—perhaps simple colonial algae or primitive sponge-like organisms.

    Individual cells, for all their self-sufficiency, faced hard limits in terms of size, complexity, and environmental resilience. But when cells began to aggregate, driven by evolutionary pressures that favored collective advantages (such as better protection from predators, more stable access to resources for the group, or improved locomotion for the colony), a new ‘entity’ emerged: the colony or simple organism. This aggregation offered a path to enhanced survival and reproduction for the genetic lineage, even if it meant individual cells lost their autonomy.

    This new collective could now perform feats impossible for any lone cell. The entire colony might move as one towards light, a coordinated dance of countless tiny parts, driven by the collective sensing of a few specialized cells. Or, a basic division of labor could appear: some cells on the exterior might specialize in protection or movement, while interior cells might focus on digestion or reproduction. These weren’t just more cells doing the same thing; these were new, colony-level actions. The colony itself was swimming; the colony itself was organizing its reproduction as a unified entity for the propagation of the whole.

    These new abilities—this coordinated movement, this shared specialization, this collective response to the environment—were properties of the colony, operable only at that collective level. Individual cells contributed their specialized functions, but they were no longer independent operators for these large-scale functions. They became parts of a larger ‘whole’ which now possessed unique capabilities. This transition, of course, came with changes for the individual cells; their roles, their very fate, and even their lifecycles became shaped by the needs and functioning of the larger collective they had become part of. The “advantage” was primarily for the multicellular entity’s survival and ability to exploit new niches, illustrating the top-down influence inherent in this new level of organization.

    Part 4: The Unseen Hand and the Logic of Life

    The mechanism by which these higher levels exert their influence is often described as top-down causation. This is where the whole system, the emergent level, shapes the behavior and fate of its constituent parts. It’s not a mystical force, but rather the result of the new organizational structure, its internal communication pathways, and the new environment it creates for its components.

    “Reasons Before Reasoners”

    This brings us to a fascinating idea popularized by philosopher Daniel Dennett: “reasons before reasoners.” He argues that evolutionary processes can discover and implement highly effective “reasons” for certain structures or behaviors without any conscious thought or foresight on the part of the organisms involved. Evolution, through natural selection, stumbles upon solutions that work—that confer a survival or reproductive advantage. These solutions embody a kind of “logic” or “wisdom,” even if the individual components (like cells in a colony or early humans adopting agriculture) have no understanding of the grander “reasons” behind why these arrangements are beneficial at a higher level.

    The cells in our multicellular example don’t “understand” the colony’s strategy for finding light or reproducing. They simply respond to local cues and genetic programming that, over eons, has been shaped because it contributed to the colony’s success. Similarly, early farmers weren’t consciously designing a global agricultural system; they were making immediate choices that, cumulatively, led to a profound restructuring of human society. The “reasons” for these systems’ existence and persistence are embedded in their adaptive advantages, not necessarily in the conscious deliberation of their parts.

    The Invisible Architecture and the Allure of the Collective

    This leads to a crucial observation: the influence of the “top layer” is often unperceived, or at least not fully grasped, by those within it. For the individual cell, the colony is its world; its rules are the laws of nature. For humans, many societal structures, economic systems, or cultural norms form an “invisible architecture” that shapes our lives in ways we rarely question. They are the background conditions, the “water we swim in.”

    Furthermore, it’s plausible that this very lack of clear perception of the higher-level controls, or even a degree of “built-in ignorance” regarding the individual costs versus collective benefits, is itself an evolved feature. If individuals were fully cognizant of the potential diminution of their autonomy or well-being when joining or forming a collective, reluctance might prevail. However, if the formation of such higher levels is crucial for species survival or unlocking significant evolutionary advantages, then mechanisms that promote participation—perhaps an “irresistible appeal” of belonging, or a downplaying of individual sacrifice for the “greater good”—would be favored. The emergent layer becomes difficult to perceive in its totality, especially in its initial stages, even for rational beings. This subtle obscuring of the full terms of the “pact” facilitates the very emergence and entrenchment of these powerful top-down systems.

    Universality, Layering, Resilience, and Transcendence

    This dynamic of creating governing layers, which then exert top-down influence, appears to be a fractal pattern, repeating at multiple scales throughout nature and society. Complexity often builds layer upon structured layer. Cells form tissues, tissues form organs, organs form organisms. Individuals form families, families form communities, communities form nations, and nations interact in a global system. There’s a sense that one cannot simply “skip” levels in this developmental progression; each layer provides the foundation for the next, bringing with it new rules, new capabilities, and new forms of governance.

    This layered architecture contributes significantly to the resilience of the collective or species. Once a higher organizational level is established and functional, it tends to be robust against minor perturbations at the lower levels. Individual components may fluctuate, fail, or be replaced, but the integrity of the overarching structure often remains intact. This is because the higher level operates with its own set of rules and feedback loops, capable of buffering or compensating for localized issues. Dismantling such an established layer typically requires a more profound, systemic shock or a coordinated challenge from within that can overcome the cohesive forces and top-down governance of the emergent order itself.

    More than just stability, the achievement of a new, functional top layer often represents a qualitative transcendence for the species or group. It’s not merely an incremental improvement but a “level up” that can catapult the collective into a new sphere of dominance and operational capacity. The entities that successfully adopt this new layer often find themselves so overwhelmingly advantaged that they are effectively “out of sight” of their previous state or of competitors still operating at the lower level. They are no longer in the same “fray,” the same boots-on-the-ground struggle, because the new layer grants them an unmatched operational altitude and a fundamentally different way of interacting with their environment. This inherent stability and transformative power are key reasons why such emergent structures, once formed, tend to persist, become deeply entrenched, and profoundly shape the evolutionary trajectory of their components.

    Part 5: The Freedom-Optimization Continuum

    The interplay between individual components and the emergent systems they form brings another fundamental dynamic into focus: a continuum between individual freedom and collective optimization. This isn’t necessarily a zero-sum game in all instances, but a profound tension often exists.

    Principle 3: The Freedom-Optimization Trade-off in Emergent Orders

    As emergent higher-level systems evolve to optimize collective survival, propagation, or efficiency, there is often an inverse correlation with the autonomy and behavioral scope of their individual constituents. The more successfully a system optimizes for collective goals (e.g., resource acquisition, defense, reproduction), the more its internal structures and governance mechanisms tend to constrain and direct the actions of its components, shifting the balance from individual freedom towards systemic predictability and control.

    Let’s explore this:

    • The Antelope and the Cheetah: Optimization Through Adversity
      Nature offers stark illustrations of how species-level traits can be optimized, often through intense selective pressures that are dire for individuals. Consider the antelope, a creature of remarkable speed. This speed wasn’t a leisurely attainment; it was honed over generations by the relentless predation of cheetahs, the fastest land animals. For any individual antelope caught, the outcome is tragic. Yet, for the antelope species, this predator-prey dynamic has driven the evolution of incredible swiftness and agility—a clear species-level optimization. This symbolizes how what is detrimental or a restriction at the individual level can be a driving force for positive adaptation for the collective, creating complex and nuanced evolutionary narratives.
    • Two Poles of Success: Humans and Ants
      When we look at highly successful species on Earth, humans and ants stand out, yet they seem to represent different strategies along this continuum.
    • Humans: Our species’ success is often attributed to our cognitive abilities, granting us significant behavioral flexibility, foresight, and agency—hallmarks of freedom. We can innovate, adapt to diverse environments, and consciously reshape our surroundings. However, as we’ve seen, we too create and become subject to complex social, economic, and technological systems that optimize for collective ends, sometimes constraining that individual freedom.
    • Ants: Ants, on the other hand, exemplify extreme collective optimization. Their societies are marvels of efficiency, division of labor, and coordinated action, all geared towards the colony’s survival and reproduction. The individual ant has a highly prescribed role, its behaviors largely determined by chemical signals and genetic programming for the benefit of the whole. The structure is the strategy, and it exerts profound control.
    • The Gravitational Pull of Success and Entrenchment Evolution often works like the adage: “throw spaghetti at the wall and see what sticks.” When a particular strategy—be it a biological mutation, a new behavior, or a technological innovation—leads to a significant advantage (e.g., a reproductive boom, access to new resources), it tends to become rapidly adopted and entrenched. Consider the ants again. If a genetic trait or social behavior leads to more successful colony foundation and growth, it spreads. As colonies grow into supercolonies, new layers of organization might emerge. These supercolonies, by their very scale and resource control, could exert influence over constituent colonies (perhaps through competition, resource allocation, or even a form of “diplomacy” or conflict resolution between them). This creates an “infernal gear,” as I put it: success breeds larger, more complex structures, which in turn demand greater coordination and exert more comprehensive top-down control, further reducing the behavioral latitude of individual ants or even entire colonies within the super-structure. There’s often no going back; the new, larger system becomes the new reality, and its demands shape everything within it. This process, driven by the relentless pursuit of what works for the collective, can progressively narrow the scope of individual freedom.

    Part 6: The Human Equation – Agency in a World of Our Own Making

    How do these principles illuminate our own experience, particularly the perennial questions of human agency and free will? If we are constantly shaped by higher-level systems, what room is left for individual choice and self-determination?

    Agent Causation Through Principle 2

    Our second principle—Level-Exclusive Functionality and Control—offers a compelling perspective here. If uniquely human capacities like conscious thought, complex language, self-reflection, moral reasoning, and intentional long-term planning are level-exclusive functions of the integrated human organism (our complex psycho-biological “top layer”), then the “agent”—the whole, conscious person—is the natural locus of control for these functions.

    “I” think, “I” decide, “I” act, not because of some disembodied “ghost in the machine” or a special power found nowhere else in nature, but because “thinking,” “deciding,” and “acting” (in the sophisticated, self-aware way humans do) are operations that emerge at the level of the integrated “I.” This provides a naturalized view of agency. It suggests that our capacity for self-governance arises from the complexity and specific organization of our being, allowing us to be genuine causes of our actions within the framework of the level-exclusive abilities we possess.

    The “Membranes” We Inhabit

    Simultaneously, Principle 1 and Principle 3 remind us that we are also subject to the “membranes” we create and inhabit. Our societies, economies, technologies, and ideologies are all higher-level structures that we’ve built (often for good reasons, to achieve collective advantages and optimizations). Yet, these systems, once established, exert their own top-down causal influence, shaping our opportunities, our beliefs, and our behaviors, sometimes in ways that are not immediately apparent or always beneficial to every individual, and often trading degrees of freedom for perceived security or efficiency. The “Wheat Bargain” echoes in many aspects of modern life, where systems designed for progress can also create new dependencies and constraints.

    Conscious Participation: The Human Difference?

    Unlike cells in a colony, ants in a supercolony, or even early humans unknowingly ensnared by the demands of wheat, modern humans possess a unique (though perhaps not always fully utilized) capacity: self-awareness and the ability to reflect upon the systems that shape us. We can study history, analyze social structures, and critique economic models. This awareness, imperfect as it may be, offers a potential pathway to more consciously shaping the “membranes” we create and live within, and to navigate the Freedom-Optimization continuum with more intention.

    If top-down causation is a fundamental aspect of how complex systems operate, then true agency might not lie in escaping it entirely (which may be impossible), but in understanding it and striving to influence the nature of those higher-level controls. Can we become more deliberate architects of the systems that govern us, designing them to better align with both collective well-being and individual flourishing, consciously weighing the trade-offs between optimization and freedom? This is perhaps one of the central challenges of the human condition.

    VIII. Conclusion: The Echoes of Emergence

    The three principles explored here—Emergent Governance for Scaled Advantage, Level-Exclusive Functionality and Control, and The Freedom-Optimization Trade-off—offer a lens through which to view a fundamental dynamic at play across vast scales of existence. From the aggregation of cells into organisms to the formation of human societies and the very structure of our conscious minds, a recurring pattern unfolds:

    Constituent parts come together, or are organized, to form higher-level entities that unlock new potentials. These emergent entities then inevitably exert a guiding, sometimes constraining, influence over their components, often optimizing for collective goals which can impact individual autonomy. Furthermore, these new levels often give rise to entirely novel capabilities that can only be operated by and at that higher level.

    Recognizing this pattern doesn’t diminish the importance of individual action or the quest for freedom. Instead, it reframes our understanding of where our agency lies and how it operates within these complex, layered realities. It suggests that the creation of order and complexity inherently involves this intricate dance between bottom-up formation, subsequent top-down governance, and the ongoing negotiation between individual scope and collective efficiency.

    The challenge, particularly for us as humans, is to become more aware of these invisible currents and the architectures of the systems we inhabit. By understanding how emergent orders shape their makers, we might become more skillful and ethical participants in the ongoing co-creation of our world, striving to build systems that not only advance the collective but also honor and preserve meaningful degrees of freedom for the individuals within them. How does recognizing this universal dynamic change your perspective on your role, the nature of progress, or the future we are collectively building?